

**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Position Classification--FBIS Foreign National Employees

FROM:

Director, Foreign Broadcast  
Information Service

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

29 September 1981

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Deputy Director for  
Science and Technology  
Room 6E45, Headquarters

2.

3. Director of Personnel  
Room 5E13, Headquarters

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For 1 and 3.

This package contains: 1) A memorandum that includes recommendations for the Director of Personnel in paragraphs 6 and 7, and 2) an attachment that provides background information. The memorandum and attachment are intended to provide you with FBIS' views on the critical problems regarding classification and compensation of our foreign national employees that stem from the new State Department personnel system. The recommendations are aimed at reaching results that will both meet the Office of Personnel's requirements and achieve an effective, equitable system for administering foreign nationals.

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29 SEP 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

FROM:   
Director, Foreign Broadcast Information Service

SUBJECT: Position Classification--FBIS Foreign National Employees

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1. Since early 1980, at the direction of the Office of Personnel, FBIS has been attempting to bring its foreign national employee positions into conformity with the new Interagency Wage and Classification System operated by the Department of State. During 1979 there were preliminary discussions between PMCD and FBIS as to the advisability of FBIS participation in the system, as well as discussions between the Agency and State. On 25 February 1980, at a meeting with FBIS management, the D/PPPM directed that FBIS and PMCD develop job standards for FBIS foreign national positions which would become part of State's FSN position standard handbook; that PMCD assist and represent FBIS in dealing with State on job standards, classification and compensation issues; that FBIS reduce and eventually eliminate non-conforming pay scales; and that PMCD provide guidance to FBIS on other forms of compensation which could be used as employment inducements if State pay scales proved inadequate. This directive by the D/PPPM apparently resulted from a memorandum from C/PMCD dated 6 February 1980 expressing dissatisfaction with the role of PMCD in approving non-conforming wage scales, and recommending that FBIS move toward conformity with the new Interagency FSN Position Classification and Compensation System.

2. Thus, although FBIS had to that point viewed the State system with some skepticism, the D/PPPM made it clear that the Agency had made a decision that PMCD would no longer be the focal point for developing and approving FBIS foreign wage scales, which it had been for many years. FBIS foreign position classification and compensation was to be moved into a State system about which FBIS had little knowledge and information, with PMCD as the primary representative in dealing with State.

3. Since that time FBIS has gained considerable experience in attempting to work with the new Interagency System. That experience has been negative in a number of fundamental aspects. The attachment outlines the problems FBIS has encountered with the system both in practice and in terms of the conflict of basic personnel management philosophies and policies. The principal points are as follows:

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SUBJECT: Position Classification--FBIS Foreign National Employees

a. The new position classification system is "interagency" in name only. In actual fact it is a State Department system. It is designed to State's requirements, and State is making the rules. FBIS was never requested to participate in the design of the System and has had no success in influencing it.

b. At this point the FSN Interagency Position Classification System cannot really be called a "system" at all. It is being simultaneously developed and implemented, experimentally, seemingly without regard for the impact this unformulated approach is having on personnel or personnel management.

c. The System presupposes that positions will be classified on the basis of detailed, coordinated standards which will be on record in the Interagency FSN Position Classification Handbook. To date FBIS has been unable to reach agreement with State on any single standard for its many unique categories of employees. Despite this, differing survey teams are classifying FBIS positions, according to State guidelines, without any common point of reference and with widely differing and sometimes damaging results. This is a complete reversal of how we understand the System is intended to work.

d. Once an FBIS position is classified State regards the decision as binding on FBIS. The classification cannot be reviewed for an entire year without going through a complicated and time-consuming appeals process which permits representatives of AID, ICA, Agriculture and others to rule on the classification of the FBIS position.

e. The 6 February 1980 PMCD memorandum acknowledged that State's practice of integrating classification with compensation surveys "does not represent a sound approach for the Agency, however, since the surveys do not now include proper class titles or uniform criteria for evaluating or collecting data on unique FBIS positions such as Monitors." Yet this practice has been used to the great disadvantage of FBIS. In Bangkok we were forced to agree with the 100 percent downgrading of bureau personnel so as to permit implementation of a cost-of-living increase which affected the entire mission. It appears the same thing is now about to happen in Nicosia.

f. FBIS has expended contract funds and hundreds of man-hours, including a GS-14 virtually full-time, in attempting to work with the System. There is no hope that this drain on our manpower will end in the foreseeable future. The System is being both designed and implemented by a single classification officer at State Department--perhaps indicative of the priority State itself attaches to implementation of this System. To date they have managed to classify  overseas posts.

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SUBJECT: Position Classification--FBIS Foreign National Employees

g. The Interagency System is not a merit system. Employees are hired at the grade at which their position is classified. Promotion opportunities are not built into the System and there are no career incentives. FBIS has always tried to develop a career concept for its foreign employees.

h. FBIS foreign national employees are appointed employees of the Director of Central Intelligence. Under the Interagency System FBIS is losing management control over these employees. We have been hampered by State's rules regarding recruiting, promotions, QSI's, and PSI's; and State is even attempting to tell us how to organize our overseas structure in some cases.

i. FBIS is not the only agency having difficulties with the system. Foreign Commerce Services, ICA, and Agriculture are all having problems. We understand that Department of Agriculture has taken the position that the Secretary retains classification authority as a matter of law and cannot delegate it to another agency. State appears to feel, however, that our Agency has relinquished full authority to State.

4. I am deeply concerned about the effects the new Interagency System is having on   FBIS foreign national employees and on our ability to manage our own operations. I feel we cannot continue to subordinate our personnel and the integrity of our operations to the tug of war of a classification system which is being developed and implemented piecemeal and in such a manner as to disregard basic requirements which are essential to the performance of the FBIS mission.

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5. On the basis of our experience thus far, I have concluded that the situation probably can only be saved by our withdrawal from the System. At the same time I am sympathetic with PMCD's desire to see in FBIS a more coherent and internally consistent FN classification and pay structure which can be more readily administered centrally.

6. To that end I recommend that CIA contract promptly with a firm of professional personnel management consultants to prepare a study reviewing the problem of FBIS foreign national position classification and to make recommendations for development and implementation of a worldwide uniform classification and compensation system applicable to the FBIS mission and its personnel.


7. I further recommend, until such study can be completed, that State be advised that, since CIA is not a signatory to the Interagency

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Classification and Compensation System, final decisions regarding the grading of FBIS positions will rest with the Agency.

8. I request your urgent attention to these recommendations.



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Attachment:  
As stated

FBIS/Ops,  (28Sep81)

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Distribution:

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- 1 - DD/S&T
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## FBIS EXPERIENCE WITH THE INTERAGENCY WAGE AND CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

### A. Background

1. FBIS differs from all other U.S. Government agencies operating overseas in that FBIS field bureaus rely exclusively on foreign nationals for the performance of their collection tasks, and thereby the essential functions of the FBIS mission. FBIS field bureaus are highly complex operations staffed with skilled and educated language and area specialists, and with personnel trained in handling sophisticated radio engineering and communications equipment.

2. Other agencies employ American staff to perform essential functions. Their American staffs are supported or assisted by foreign national employees, but the foreign nationals are rarely responsible for performance of the critical mission tasks. FBIS bureaus on the other hand are guided by very small staffs of American managers and generalist editors. The responsibility for the basic FBIS product and the care of the actual technical plant and its equipment are in the hands of the foreign national employees. This has proven to be a most efficient and cost effective way of carrying out the FBIS mission, primarily because of the unique skills, loyalty, initiative, and continuity provided by the foreign nationals. The alternative to this management approach would be to maintain a very large and expensive complement of U.S. staff linguists, engineers, and communicators overseas.

3. Over the years FBIS has been able to build cadres of professional foreign national employees who have been trained and encouraged to shoulder great responsibility and to approach their jobs with the same sense of commitment we expect from a U.S. staff employee. FBIS foreign nationals are expected to do whatever it takes to get the job done. This can mean being called in at all hours of the night or on weekends to cover fastbreaking developments or international crises, staying on the job until major speeches or news bulletins are completely translated and sent to Washington, and finally placing the urgent needs of the service above personal concerns. FBIS has been able to command this loyalty and commitment because of its personnel management philosophy and policies.

4. In February 1980 FBIS was directed by the Office of Personnel to try to bring its foreign national positions into conformity with the new Interagency Wage and Classification System being developed by Department of State. This System follows a totally different personnel management philosophy from the one FBIS has traditionally followed and found successful. It is based largely on the assumption that an American will be in control of or perform the major or most vital elements of the work. With this in mind agencies which belong to the Interagency System are able to take a personnel management approach which does not take into consideration how competent or how productive an employee may be. It considers only what his basic duties are.

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5. In other words, the Interagency System is not a merit system. It does not encourage upward mobility and does not reward the employee on the basis of performance and expertise. By their own admission the designers of the System are satisfied with hiring only average employees. In a sense they regard foreign national employees as easily "replaceable parts" and do not encourage a career concept. They are not bothered by high turnover since low level skills can be easily replaced.

6. FBIS has never functioned and cannot function in this way. Its personnel are too specialized, too hard to find, and too difficult to replace to treat in such a casual manner. FBIS deals with long-term careers, not merely jobs.

7. FBIS management is profoundly concerned about the effect the Interagency System will have on our ability to retain and attract qualified employees, and thus on the overall success of the FBIS mission. FBIS monitors must have strong linguistic abilities in at least two languages--English and their native language(s). They must have in-depth area knowledge of the target countries. This combination of skills is very rare. These employees must also acquire difficult radio monitoring skills on the job. They require years of training to reach their full potential. Given these job requirements it is wasteful and counterproductive for FBIS to adopt a classification system which will force increased turnover among its employees, requiring continual expensive recruiting and training of specialists in rare languages.

8. The FBIS product is highly regarded and deemed essential within the U.S. intelligence and foreign affairs community. FBIS believes that an abrupt reversal of its personnel management policy--a policy based on incentives for strong performance and which has served it well for 40 years--will adversely affect this product.

9. Moreover, the Interagency System is depressing recruitment grades to the point where FBIS already is experiencing difficulty hiring the personnel it needs. Increased turnover with its attendant problems of loss of expertise, and added training and recruitment costs, will result in increased manpower demands at a time when efforts are being made to hold down the size of U.S. mission abroad. If the normal turnover rate increases, as it certainly will, FBIS bureaus will be required to increase their basic T/O's to retain expertise and to accommodate the extra workloads. The FBIS product is critically time sensitive; information derived from international broadcasts cannot be put aside until a bureau is properly staffed to handle it.

#### B. Development and Management of the Interagency System

10. The Interagency Wage and Position Classification System is "interagency" in name only. FBIS has had no voice in how the system is being structured or developed. It is a State Department-designed system, being developed along lines which conform to State's personnel profiles, and State is calling all the shots. For example, although the System provides for a 12-grade position structure, not all State posts require

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the full 12 grades. Smaller State posts often have grade structures reaching only to FSN-11 or lower. State contends that FBIS must live within post grade structures, even if FBIS has employees fully qualified for the FSN-12 grade according to position standards. In other words the employee must not only meet all criteria of the Position Standards but he must also be lucky enough to be working at a post which State, for its own purposes, has made a 12 grade post.

11. FBIS has bureaus with wide-ranging regional responsibilities located at relatively small State posts, e.g., Cyprus, Bahrain. Though State claims the System provides universal grading, and sets a goal of uniform grades throughout regardless of location, this is not the case in practice. Limiting grading to the post ceiling makes no allowance for the fact that all FBIS bureaus have regional responsibilities. FBIS never establishes a bureau only to monitor events in the host country. Reception and the ability to recruit needed language skills dictate the location of an FBIS bureau. The actual country or size of mission has little to do with the size of an FBIS operation or its responsibilities. FBIS is not in Vienna to monitor events in Austria, but to monitor communist Eastern Europe.

12. The Interagency Classification System can hardly be called a "system" at all. It is being developed and implemented simultaneously. State itself admits that this is a mistake. Some of the most basic policies guiding the System are still undecided. For example, such a fundamental element as the role of supervisors and how they are graded has not yet been fully worked out.

13. FBIS relies heavily on shift work. State does not. The System makes no provision whatever for grading shift supervisors, and in some instances State has proposed grade structures which, in order to provide a grade spread to accommodate supervisor functions, would force FBIS to impose totally arbitrary and illogical organization patterns on its operations. It is premature at best and destructive at worst to plunge FBIS' entire overseas operation, built up over a period of 40 years, into a System that is so underdeveloped and in a state of constant change.

14. FBIS has devoted hundreds of hours of unprogrammed manpower, drawn from other essential activities, in its efforts to bring its positions into conformity with the Interagency System. Numerous appeals and reclassification proposals are generated by this system and must be handled on a regular basis at great expense to management resources in Headquarters and in the field. Despite this draining commitment of manpower, virtually no progress has been made and there is no end in sight. The System is grossly labor-intensive. The draft monitor standards alone run to 40 pages. Moreover, the entire System is in the hands of a single State classification officer who is attempting both to develop the System and simultaneously to implement it worldwide. To date State has been able to classify  overseas posts.

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15. For the Interagency System to work as intended, position classification is supposed to take place on the basis of coordinated Position Standards which, when approved, are entered into the Interagency Position Standards Handbook. These are to provide a common point of reference for the classification teams. Last January FBIS submitted to State draft standards for its monitor positions, our most critical job category. Standards for our other job categories were submitted last April. To date we have not been able to reach agreement with State on a single one of these position standards. The draft monitor standards were rewritten completely by State in an unacceptable form which did not reflect the true nature of the jobs. They were redrafted in FBIS and returned to State. On 26 August State sent back the monitor standards, again rewritten by them and again unsatisfactory.

16. Nevertheless State plans to classify FBIS positions in London and Nicosia this September, using two different classification teams who will be working without uniform standards with which to judge the positions and without such elementary issues as supervisory grades having worked out. The team leader of State's London survey team told FBIS it is unfortunate the survey is being conducted without FBIS Position Standards, because it is less than ideal to operate on the basis of General Grade Guidelines or of Position Standards for other State jobs that do not fully compare with FBIS positions. In other words, during the seemingly endless delay in obtaining agreement from State on FBIS Position Standards, FBIS employees are being judged on the basis of irrelevant State Position Standards. State says they will "test" the draft monitor standards during these surveys. This a complete reversal of how the System is supposed to work. As will be seen below, having our bureaus surveyed without standards has produced uneven results and has caused grave problems at some bureaus.

17. FBIS positions do not fit the general pattern of State's jobs. In fact there are no equivalent positions in other Government agencies or in the private sector. We are surprised that State would even want to include such a complicated and atypical office as FBIS in the System before an approach has been developed which can be applied satisfactorily to State's own positions.

18. FBIS is by no means the only agency having problems with the Interagency System. Officers in State itself have voiced concern about the way the System is operating in practice. One State regional personnel officer told an FBIS bureau chief she could not understand why FBIS monitors should even be part of the State system, that FBIS monitors were too different, the requirements were too high for them to ever fit under the system. The State personnel officer at another post told FBIS that the embassy is facing serious problems in implementing the system because it is constantly changing its groundrules, it is too rigid (an operation must be on the verge of collapse before exceptions are granted), proper Position Standards have not been drafted, and the Washington office is too understaffed to provide timely decisions or guidance to the field. Other agencies are even more concerned. ICA and the Department of Agriculture believe that they retain ultimate authority over classification and that they cannot legally surrender this authority to another agency

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even if they were willing to do so. In FBIS' case, however, possibly encouraged by what they perceive to be Office of Personnel's position, State appears to feel that CIA has relinquished total classification authority over the DCI's appointed employees.

19. In addition, State has taken the position that the provisions of a 1980 Foreign Service Act are binding on FBIS. This has led them into the whole area of FBIS foreign national administration as they have taken the position that recruitment grades, promotions, procedures for awards, PSI's and QSI's, and grievance and appeal channels are all subject to Departmental rules. Personnel actions regarding FBIS employees have been subject to review and approval by post personnel officers. As noted, State has even proposed that we reorganize our foreign national personnel at some bureaus in ways which do not agree with operational objectives but which meet arbitrary and illogical classification objectives.

20. FBIS was directed to conform to the Interagency Classification System only as regards classification and compensation of its foreign national employees. After some 6 months FBIS was finally able to send a message through State to all posts where FBIS is located indicating that FBIS is cooperating with State only for classification purposes and is not handing over total management of its foreign national personnel. FBIS had faced situations where promotions and other personnel actions concerning our employees were held up at the post. In Abidjan the post's administrative officer held up a promotion because in his opinion the employee's Performance Appraisal Report did not seem high enough to rate a promotion. In several posts, where it is not post policy for employees to receive a PSI just prior to promotion, FBIS was forced to adhere to post policy even though such policy differs from post to post and does not reflect FBIS policy. Perhaps the message sent by State will rectify these types of occurrences.

21. It is clear that entering the Interagency Classification System only for classification and compensation purposes, though possible in theory, brings with it a whole host of other administrative problems. Even if State now gives up its control over all aspects of personnel management, FBIS is convinced that giving State control over classification is a mistake.

22. We believe the final authority to set wages and classify FBIS positions must continue to reside with CIA and this must be made clear to State. The legal basis for authorizing State to classify DCI-appointed employees is questionable. Congress directed the Secretary of State to coordinate with other agencies operating overseas to insure "compatible"--but not identical--pay schedules for foreign national employees. These general instructions apply to those agencies "wishing to use the provisions of the Foreign Service Act." Since FBIS is not recognized by State as a foreign affairs agency, and since FBIS employees come under the authority of the DCI, FBIS cannot afford to pursue a course which would result in the DCI and the Director, FBIS losing control of the Agency's employees.

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C. Some Bureau by Bureau Problems

23. The Bangkok Experience--Bangkok Bureau was established in 1966 to provide improved coverage of South and Southeast Asia and as a back-stop for the former Saigon Bureau. Coverage shifts from Okinawa and Saigon bureaus were made during the first years of the new bureau, and FBIS third country national employees (TCN's) were transferred to Bangkok to man the bureau along with new hires--both local and third country nationals. The wage scale used by the American Embassy in Bangkok could not be used by FBIS in forming this bureau because it was much too low to attract new hires from other countries or to offer its TCN transfers from Okinawa (well-educated Indians, Indonesians, Burmese, Vietnamese, and other ethnic groups FBIS requires are not available locally). FBIS was thus forced to create its own professional scale, developed by PMCD, outside the embassy scale in order to form a viable bureau.

24. In line with the current effort to conform with the Interagency System, FBIS underwent a wage and compensation survey in Bangkok in 1979 even though no position standards had been developed for FBIS jobs. Bureau employees were taken off the previous nonconforming scale and placed on the embassy scale. The bureau suffered 100 percent downgradings. The result was severe attitude problems by the staff, calmed only after bureau personnel were placed on "scale retention" for two years at FBIS management insistence. FBIS would not have originally accepted this massive downgrading except that we were told by PMCD that to refuse would hold up implementation of a cost-of-living increase which affected the entire mission.

25. When the Bangkok staff goes off salary retention, they will enter Saved Rate status and obtain only 50 percent of all subsequent cost of living and other increases until they reach the established salary. Since they have been on an entirely different, higher wage scale, this means that Bangkok Bureau's employees will be on Saved Rate for an average of 8 years--up to 13 years in some cases. Only one employee has resigned thus far, although several valued FSN's have indicated their intention to do so if the situation is not corrected. They are confident FBIS will not let them down and are waiting. But even if there are not numerous resignations when the bureau enters Saved Rate, there are obvious difficulties in managing an operation where the entire staff sees its salary diminishing in real terms for such an extended period. Aside from possible resignations and ongoing morale problems, the new wage structure will not attract any qualified monitors from third world countries.

26. Under the new scale the starting salary for monitors in Bangkok is \$4,400, only minimally higher than in Indonesia and India where FBIS has to recruit, and where the starting foreign service national salary for someone in the same grade is \$4,300 and \$4,000 respectively. In Australia, where FBIS must also recruit, particularly for hard-to-find Cambodian linguists, the starting FSN salary is \$12,000. The bureau has

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already experienced difficulty in attracting qualified applicants for its Cambodian positions--which cannot be filled locally owing to Thai political sensitivities.

27. In short, FBIS has been set back to where it started when the bureau was founded: Because of the nature of the Thai economy and the extremely low salaries paid in Thailand, FBIS will be unable to attract or hold professional employees from other countries. They have no reason to relocate for the kind of salary FBIS can offer on the embassy scale.

28. The varying pay scales developed for each mission will also severely impair FBIS' ability to transfer area radio coverage packages, with the linguistic and technical personnel necessary to implement inter-bureau changes, as was done when Bangkok Bureau was originally founded. Such transfers have occurred often in FBIS' history, and this tool for rationalizing coverage responsibilities in the face of changing reception patterns or other operating conditions should not be given up without full realization that its loss constitutes a constriction of the Agency collection capability and of management's ability to plan against future requirements.

29. The impact of this system on our employees' retirement is another major concern. As mentioned above, Bangkok Bureau's coverage responsibilities require the bureau to employ numerous TCN's, ten of whom are U.S. Permanent Resident Aliens (PRA). Some of the latter worked for FBIS in Saigon and FBIS obtained PRA status for them when Saigon fell. Others transferred from Okinawa, which has higher salaries in dollar equivalency terms. Many of these employees have been with FBIS for many years and are now reaching retirement age. They are in a position of not only seeing the Thai currency fall in value (thus affecting their retirement base) but of also seeing their salary fall behind inflation both in Bangkok and in the States at a time when they are looking toward building up a high three salary which will allow them to survive on their CSR retirement in the States.

30. Seoul Bureau--Seoul Bureau was one of the first FBIS bureaus to be classified under the Interagency System. It was agreed to survey Seoul on an advisory basis, but FBIS later accepted the results of the survey with the understanding that it would be able to appeal the survey and come up with a more reasonable grade structure for the bureau. The survey was, as elsewhere, carried out without Position Standards. Our FSN positions were classified at unsatisfactorily low levels, and the employees have been frozen in those grades for two years. Initially the bureau's employees accepted this situation because they simultaneously received a large cost of living increase, but after two years they are becoming apprehensive. State's classification office is now reviewing newly prepared job descriptions for the entire bureau and plans to do another survey based on these descriptions--without desk audits and still without proper Position Standards. The Seoul Bureau technician is

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threatening to resign if not promoted, and it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to replace him with another foreign national of equal skill. There will probably be other resignations soon if there is not prompt action. But the actions must come from State as things stand now. These employees cannot be told that a promotion is possible soon, because there is no indication what grade the State classifiers will attach to the job or when a decision will be reached.

31. FBIS local technicians in Jordan and Hong Kong face the same problem. In each case these technicians are the only technical experts at the bureau; there is no American present with any technical expertise. In Jordan the technician is one of the best in the country, and it would be difficult to find a foreign national replacement of any kind, let alone one half as well qualified. If FBIS loses the Jordan technician, it will probably have to assign an American staff engineer there.

32. London/Nicosia Surveys--FBIS bureaus in London and Nicosia are scheduled to be surveyed in September. Based on experience with the System we anticipate a high percentage of downgradings, which will impact heavily on the operations of these bureaus.

33. Nicosia Bureau was formed in 1975 when the large FBIS bureau at Kyrenia, Cyprus, was evacuated during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The core of FBIS' best Arabic and Greek monitors and other foreign national staff were relocated at the smaller Nicosia Bureau. As a result the reconstituted bureau ended up with a deceptively highly graded staff of employees, having lost the substructure of the old bureau which was dispersed to other bureaus. In other words, the Turkish invasion and subsequent relocation of the FBIS bureau is the reason for having so many highly graded experts at one bureau, but in fact they are all experts with many years of experience. They are providing just as valuable a service in their present coverage of Cairo, Libyan, and Lebanese media as they did in their similar duties at the large bureau. A second problem is that Cyprus is another country where State's scale does not call for a 12 grade scale, even though FBIS requires a full 12 grades for its scale.

34. In London the main concern is for the 26-man 24-hour communications center which is the most vital link in FBIS' communications system, acting as a relay point for FBIS bureaus in Europe and the Middle East as well as serving FBIS' BBC partners and the bureau itself. State has no operation similar to this but seems predisposed to judge these positions on the basis of comparisons with State communications centers. The FBIS communications center, incidentally, is completely under the supervision of a foreign national employee.

35. Aside from this, FBIS is in a very vulnerable position in England. It is co-located with the BBC Monitoring Service, some 40 miles outside London. The relationship of CIA and BBC is delicate, and any disruption to FBIS operations would be resented by the British Government.

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Our partnership with the BBC is extremely valuable in terms of cost and efficiency. Harming this partnership would have a serious negative impact on FBIS operations worldwide. There also is a high risk of unionization, given the generally bellicose nature of labor relations in Britain. BBC itself is heavily unionized and has come close to being shut down by its workers on several occasions. It would require only a little push for this to spread to FBIS employees.

36. Vienna--State's classification office is now reviewing job descriptions from Vienna Bureau. State already has advised FBIS that it will undergo massive downgradings at this bureau but has suggested that, to protect against two-grade downgradings, FBIS could reorganize the bureau and create layers of supervision which heretofore have not been judged necessary. Vienna is another State post on an 11-grade scale, so the Department contends that it is impossible to obtain an FSN-12 grade even for our veteran chief monitor.

#### D. Conclusion

37. Despite major efforts over the past two years to move towards conformity with the Interagency Classification and Compensation System, FBIS has become convinced that the System structure cannot accommodate our requirements. It is designed for an individual post, for employees locally controlled and under direct American supervision, not for an organization with regional responsibility, limited American supervision, central personnel administration and around-the-clock responsibilities. As a result we believe it important that Agency management review the D/OP decision to enter the System. A number of viable alternatives (Professional scale, GS scale, expatriate scale, contract employment, international organization comparability) exist that could address the needs of FBIS better than the narrowly-focused Interagency System being developed by State.

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